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THE RIGHTS OF A REVERSIONARY LESSEE




Ordinarily, a tenant encounters few difficulties in gaining pos-
session of the leased premises at the beginning of his term. When,
however, a new lessee is excluded from possession by a prior tenant
holding over without right, important questions arise as to the
remedies of the new lessee. This Comment will deal with the
rights and remedies of such a reversionary lessee,' under Pennsyl-
vania law, against both the lessor and the holdover tenant where
the lessee is prevented from entering the demised premises by the
wrongful acts of the holdover tenant.2 As will be developed in this
Comment, the law of Pennsylvania provides little satisfaction to a
lessee in such a situation.
An important distinction exists between a lease in reversion
and an agreement to lease. An agreement to lease is an executory
contract, whereas a lease in reversion is an executed contract and a
conveyanceA An agreement to lease vests no estate in the proposed
lessee,4 while a lease in reversion vests in the lessee an interest in
the term which may be perfected into rightful possesion by entry
when that term has begun.5 The holder of such an interest, which
is often referred to as an interesse termini, is protected against acts
of the lessor which prevent him from taking possession,6 however,
it is doubtful that the holder of an interesse termini is protected
against acts of third parties.
7
1. A reversionary lessee is one who holds under a lease which be-
comes effective at the expiration of a prior lease. Such a lease may arise
by making the time for the beginning of one lease correspond with the
time for the termination of the previous lease or by wording the second
lease with reference to the prior lease so as to become effective upon its
termination. 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord & Tenant § 100 (1970).
2. This Comment will deal with the rights of a "landlord" against a
holdover tenant only so far as they relate to rights of a lessee. Neither the
lessee's nor the landlord's measure of damages will be discussed.
3. STERN's TRICKETT ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 8
(3d ed. 1950).
4. Henderson v. Clay Mfg. Co., 24 Pa. Super. 422, 425 (1905).
5. Williams v. Downing, 18 Pa. 60, 63 (1851).
6. McClurg v. Price, 59 Pa. 420 (1868).
7. See Section I and accompanying notes infra.
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The common law rule that entry by the lessee was required to
consummate an estate for years has been modified in Pennsylvania
by the recording statutes.' The recording of a lease for a term ex-
ceeding twenty-one years or for a shorter term when the lease is
unaccompanied by possession is considered the equivalent of physi-
cal entry, by virtue of the statute, for the purposes of consummat-
ing the relationship of landlord and tenantY Thus, where the les-
see has recorded his lease, he ceases to be the mere holder of an
interesse termini and becomes the holder of an estate for years, en-
titled to possession when the term begins. 10
It is suggested that all leases in reversion be recorded, since
by definition, possession does not accompany such a lease. The act
of recording would obviate many of the problems of a lessee who
has not entered the demised premises, but who wishes to take ac-
tion against a holdover tenant. In practice, however, few leases for
use and occupancy for a term of less than twenty-one years are
recorded. In recognition of this fact, this Comment will only deal
with unrecorded leases for a term.
I. LESSEE'S RIGHTS AGAINST THE HoLDOVER TENANT
A number of remedies are available to regain possession of real
property: ejectment, summary proceeding, forcible detainer, in-
junction, and self-help. This section will examine the availability
of these conventional remedies as applied to a reversionary lessee
and also those compensatory remedies to which such a lessee might
have access in an action against a holdover tenant.
A. Ejectment
At common law, no lease for years was looked upon as complete
until there was an actual entry by the lessee." It has long been
settled in Pennsylvania that the right to possession as against a
third party is in the lessor until the lessee enters.12 Upon such en-
try, the right of possession is transferred from the lessor to the
lessee, enabling the latter to maintain an action in ejectment. 3
Before entry, the lessee holds only an interesse termini, an interest
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 471 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 9751 (1956).
9. St. Vincents Roman Catholic Cong. v. Kingston Coal Co., 221 Pa.
349, 363, 70 A. 838, 844 (1908).
10. Id.
11. Sennett v. Bucher, 3 Pen. & W. 392, 393 (Pa. 1832).
12. Id. at 394.
13. Id.
which does not empower a lessee to bring an ejectment action
against a third party. 4
Stern, in his treatise on Pennsylvania landlord and tenant law,
states that when a lessee's term begins, he may obtain possession
of the demised premises by an action of ejectment against any
party in possession. 15 This statement is inaccurate, however, in
that it fails to distinguish between leases for occupancy and use
and leases for the removal of minerals.16 The rule in Pennsylvania
where real property is demised for the purpose of occupancy and
use, is that the lessee must have been in possession of the premises
before he can maintain ejectment.1" In Taylor v. Kaufhold,'8 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, speaking of the availability of
ejectment stated that "[t] he law is not clear as to whether eject-
ment would lie by a tenant who had never been in possession."'19
It would appear, however, that the confusion is again in reference
to the different standards applied to leases for use and occupancy
and leases of minerals and mineral rights. The case law is clear
that in Pennsylvania a lessee holding under a lease for use and
occupancy must have been in possession of the premises before he
can maintain an action in ejectment. 20 Mineral leases are treated
differently because they are not merely leases for use and occu-
pancy, but carry with them the title to the minerals and the right
to remove them. 21 In such leases, actual entry is not a prerequi-
site for ejectment.
22
B. Summary Proceeding for the Recovery of Possession of Real
Property
Actions before justices of the peace for the recovery of pos-
session of real property in Pennsylvania are governed by the Rules
of Civil Procedure for Justices of the Peace.23 The right to sum-
14. Williams v. Downing, 18 Pa. 60, 63 (1851).
15. STERN's TsIcKETT ON THE LAw or LANDLORD AND TENANT § 298
(3d ed. 1950).
16. Dime Bank & Trust Co. v. Walsh, 143 Pa. Super. 189, 17 A.2d 728
(1941). The court stated that leases of oil, gas, and other minerals do not
require entry to be consummated as they "are not merely leases for use
and occupancy, but carry with them the title to the minerals and the right
to remove them." Id. at 196, 17 A.2d at 731.
17. Id.
18. 368 Pa. 538, 84 A.2d 347 (1951).
19. Id. at 543-44, 84 A.2d at 350. The court cited as authority for this
proposition: Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 A. 207 (1909);
Sennett v. Bucher, 3 Pen. & W. 392 (Pa. 1832); Dime Bank & Trust Co.
v. Walsh, 143 Pa. Super. 189, 17 A.2d 728 (1941). These cases held that
ejectment would not lie where a lessee, holding under a lease for use and
occupancy, had not entered the premises.
20. Cases cited note 19 supra.
21. See note 16 supra.
22. See, e.g., Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 A. 207
(1909).




mary procedure is granted only to those having the status of "land-
lord."12 4 There is no indication in the rules as to what persons
have the status of "landlord,125 nor have any case interpretations
been found. It is evident that the right to bring this action has
not been extended beyond the interpretations under the earlier
acts and case law.
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure for Jus-
tices of the Peace, summary proceedings for the recovery of pos-
session of real property were governed by article V of the Landlord
and Tenant Act of 1951.26 To begin suit under this Act for recovery
of possession, the plaintiff must have had the status of "landlord.
27
Those who were considered "landlords," other than the original
lessor, were enumerated in two sections of the Act.2 8 An examina-
tion of these sections clearly indicates that a lessee was not given
the status of "landlord" and thus had no standing to maintain such
a summary proceeding.
24. PA. R. Civ. P.J.P. (Justices of the Peace), 501:
As used in this chapter "action" means an action by a landlord
against a tenant for the recovery of real property brought before
a justice of the peace.
PA. R. Civ. P.J.P. (Justices of the Peace) 503:
c. The complaint shall set forth:
(3) that the plaintiff is the landlord of that property.
(4) that he leased or rented the property to the defendant or
to some other person under whom the defendant claims.
25. However, PA. R. Civ. P.J.P. 503(c) (4) seems to indicate that
"landlord" is to include only the original lessor.
26. PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 250.501-250.511 (§§ 250.502-250.510 sus-
pended absolutely 1970 by PA. R. Civ. P.J.P. 581).
27. STERN's TRICKETT ON THE LAw OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 487
(Supp. 1968).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.104 (1965):
Any person who acquires title to real property by descent or pur-
chase shall be liable to the same duties and shall have the
same rights, powers, and remedies in relation to the property as the
person from whom title was acquired.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.303 (1965):
(a) the following persons shall have the right to collect all rent
due by assumpsit or distraint on personal property located
on the real property subject to such rent:
(1) The owner of a ground rent;
(2) The personal representative of a deceased landlord or
deceased tenant for life who has demised the real prop-
erty subject to his estate, or a deceased landlord whose
real property has escheated to the Commonwealth,
whether such rent accrued prior to or after the death of
the decedent and until the termination of the adminis-
tration of the estate;
(3) The escheator appointed for the purpose of collecting
rents;
(4) The spouse of a deceased landlord to whom real prop-
erty has been put aside as his or her allowance by law;
and
"Landlord" status for the purposes of a summary proceeding
for the recovery of possession of real property has also been de-
fined under the case law interpreting the earlier acts. Under the
Act of 1772, access to summary proceedings was furnished to "any
person or persons in this province" having demised lands, or "his
or her heirs or assigns. ' 29 The main intent of the Act was to re-
store speedy possession to "landlords" who were entitled to it with-
out putting them to the delay and expense of an ejectment.
30
Since action under the Act of 1772 was available only to lessors,
their heirs, or assigns, 1 a lessee would have to come under one of
these categories in order to come within the purview of the Act. It
must be recognized, however, that acts which confer summary jur-
isdiction on justices of the peace are to be strictly construed, since
such proceedings were unknown at common law.32 A lessee was
not provided for by this Act, since he was neither a lessor, an heir,
or an assign. 3 In addition, there was no evidence of a legislative
intent to provide a remedy to one who could not maintain eject-
ment, where the purpose of the Act was to provide relief from the
hardships of an ejectment 2 4 No cases were found which precluded
a lessee from access to the Act's procedure. However, in a case
where a life tenant had demised the premises and died during
the term, it was held that the remainderman could not proceed
under the Act of 1772 because she was not the lessor, nor was she
the heir or assignee of the lessor, "the only persons to whom the
right accrues under the Act. 235  This reasoning would apply
equally to a lessee and prevent access to the procedure provided
by the Act of 1772.
The Act of 186326 was enacted in addition to, and not as a sub-
stitute for, the Act of 1772.37 This Act was furnished to "land-
(5) A widow who is the party named in a deed, agree-
ment or decree of court under which a charge is made
upon such real estate for the payment of installments
of dower.
(b) Any person given the right by this section to collect and dis-
train for rent shall be deemed for the purposes of this act to
be a landlord. (emphasis added)
29. Act of March 21, 1772, 1 Smith L. § 12 [1772] (Repealed 1951).
30. Logan v. Herron, 8 S. & R. 459, 461 (Pa. 1822).
31. The word "assign" is synonomous with "assignee."
32. McMillan v. McCreary, 54 Pa. 230 (1867). But see, Gardner v.
Keteltas, 3 Hill 330 (N.Y. 1842), holding that such acts being remedial in
nature should be liberally construed.
33. An assignment differs from a lease in that a lessor transfers an
interest less than his own and reserves an interest or estate after the end of
the term, while an assignment transfers the whole estate and no rent nor
interest in the property is reserved. Williams v. Randolph & C. Ry., 182
N.C. 267, 272, 108 S.E. 915, 918 (1921).
34. See Logan v. Herron, 8 S. & R. 459 (Pa. 1822).
35. May v. Kendall, 8 Phila. 244, 246 (Pa. C.P. 1871).
36. Act of December 14, 1863, No. 963, § 1, [1864] Pa. Laws 1125
(repealed 1951).
37. The principle differences between the Act of 1863 and the Act of
1772 were that the Act of 1963 did not require twelve jurors and provided
for certiorari. The Act of 1863 applied only to leases of one year or more
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lords" s and was later supplemented by the Act of 186719 to cover
cases in which the owner of the demised premises had acquired
title by descent or purchase from the original lessor.40 The right
to proceed under this Act was based on the existence of a landlord-
tenant relationship between the parties.41 A lessee under a lease in
reversion does not stand in a landlord-tenant relationship with the
tenant in possession even though that tenant has held over into
the time the lease in reversion was to have commenced.
42
From the above analysis of the pertinent acts and rules, their
purposes and the case law interpreting them, it is evident that the
summary proceeding for the recovery of possession of real property
in Pennsylvania is not available to a lessee, especially since the right
to possession of the premises is in the lessor as against third par-
ties until entry by the lessee.4
3
C. Forcible Detainer
The primary purpose of the Pennsylvania forcible detainer
statute44 is to prevent breaches of the peace. Its purpose is not
to provide an alternative civil remedy despite the restitution
clause.4 5 By the terms of the statute, a charge of forcible detainer
but was supplemented to include leases for less than one year by the Act
of March 31, 1905. No. 62, §§ 1-3 [1905] Pa. Laws 87 (repealed 1951).
38. "Any person . . . , having demised or leased lands . . . it shall be
lawful for such lessor, his agent or attorney to complain." Act of Decem-
ber 14, 1863, No. 963, § 1, [1864] Pa. Laws 1125 (repealed 1951).
39. Act of February 20, 1867, No. 10, § 1, [1867] Pa. Laws 30 (re-
pealed 1951).
40. This supplemental Act was not really necessary since the statute
of 32 Hen. 8, c. 34 was in effect in Pennsylvania, stating that grantees or
assignees of the reversion, or assignees of lessors shall enjoy the same
benefits which lessors or grantees had or enjoyed. Shappel v. Himel-
stein, 121 Pa. Super. 418, 421, 183 A. 644, 646 (1936).
41. Koontz v. Hamond, 62 Pa. 177, 182 (1869); Woodward v. Wood-
ward, 57 Pa. D. & C. 423, 427 (C.P. Wash. 1946).
42. 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord & Tenant § 100 (1970); Kokomo Rubber
Co. v. Anderson, 33 Ga. App. 241, 125 S.E. 76 (1926).
43. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4404 (1963):
Whoever, by force and with a strong hand, or by menaces
and threats, unlawfully holds and keeps possession of any
lands or tenements, whether the possession was obtained peace-
ably, or otherwise is guilty of forcible detainer, a misdemeanor,
and upon conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to pay a fine not
exceeding five hundred dollars ($500), or to undergo imprison-
ment not exceeding one (1) year, or both, and make restitution of
the lands and tenements unlawfully detained.
No person shall be adjudged guilty of forcible detainer, if such
person, by himself, or by those under whom he claims, have been
in peaceable possession for three (3) years next preceding such
alleged forcible detainer.
45. Commonwealth v. Leibowitz, 103 Pa. Super. 479, 482, 157 A. 219,
220 (1931). See note 44 supra.
must allege an unlawful detention of the premises "by force and
with a strong hand" or "menaces and threats" calculated to alarm
or frighten.4 6 The allegation of a common trespass is insufficient
to warrant a conviction for unlawful detainer.4 7
A lessee who is excluded from possession by a holdover tenant
may not charge the holdover tenant with forcible detainer for the
purpose of invoking the restitution clause. In order to come within
the scope of the Act, the prosecutor must aver a prior possession
of the premises.4S The possession of the prosecutor cannot be as-
sumed, it must be proved. 49 In the trial of an indictment for forci-
ble detainer, the title to the premises is not involved; it is the pos-
session of the prosecutor which the law protects against acts of vio-
lence.50
D. Injunction
As a general rule, the equitable remedy of injunctive relief
cannot be used merely to gain possession. 1 The reason for this
limitation is the presumption that a plaintiff seeking possession of
real property has an adequate remedy at law, namely, either eject-
ment or an equivalent statutory remedy. However, this is not an
immutable rule. In Sun Oil Company v. Merlino5 2 the Common
Pleas Court of Westmoreland County held that equitable relief
might be proper to specifically enforce a lease where ejectment
might not be available because the lessee had never been in pos-
session 53 and where there was no adequate means of determining
the plaintiff's potential lossA 4  In the situation where a lessee,
holding under a lease in reversion, has never entered the premises,
there is no remedy at law in Pennsylvania for the recovery of pos-
session from a wrongful holdover. 55 Furthermore, actions for dam-
ages are either improper or are suspended until possession is
gained.56  In cases where the ordinary remedies at law are inade-
quate, the extraordinary remedy of injunction may be available to
the lessee to obtain possession of the demised premises. 5 7 How-
46. Commonwealth v. Brown, 138 Pa. 447, 452, 21 A. 17 (1891). See
note 44 supra.
47. Id.
48. Id. But see Commonwealth v. Wisner, 8 Phila. 612 (Pa. C.P.
1871), holding that a lessee having the right to possession could maintain
the prosecution. Note however that this position is not representative of
the current status of the law.
49. Commonwealth v. Randall, 63 Pa. Super. 238, 243 (1916).
50. Commonwealth v. Tillia, 73 Pa. Super. 548 (1920).
51. Bussier v. Weekey, 4 Pa. Super. 69, 72 (1897).
52. 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 94 (C.P. West. 1954).
53. The plaintiff might well have been able to bring ejectment in
this case since the action was against the lessor rather than a third party.
54. Sun Oil Co. v. Merlino, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 94 (C.P. Westm. 1954).
55. See notes 10-50 and accompanying text supra.
56. See notes 63-81 and accompanying text infra.
57. Vance v. Henderson, 141 Neb. 758,4 N.W.2d 833 (1942).
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ever, Pennsylvania, unlike several other states, has not decided
this question.
E. Self-help
When a tenant has no right to continue in possession, the land-
lord may expel him from the premises without process, by using
no more force than is reasonably necessary.58 The landlord will
not be liable in trespass for any consequent damages other than
those resulting from unreasonable force, since the tenant is bound
to remove himself from the premises, at the request of the landlord,
upon termination of the lease.59 A distinction was made in Com-
monwealth v. Everhart,60 however, between the civil rights of a
person forcibly turned out and the penal sanctions by which such
a person is protected from being forcibly dispossessed.6 ' Although
a dispossessed party who has no right to possession of the premises
may not bring an action in trespass against the landlord, the law
will criminally punish the landlord for the forcible entry in order
to preserve the peace.
62
It is questionable whether a lessee has a right to self-help, since
the holdover tenant's implied covenant to deliver possession at the
end of his term inures to the lessor rather than the new lessee, and
in light of the established rule placing the right to possession in the
lessor as against third parties until entry by the lessee.6 8 How-
ever, even if the lessee is entitled to self-help, which is doubtful, it
is a dubious right, which could be effectuated with impunity only
by a peaceable entry.
F. Trespass
In order to maintain an action in trespass, the plaintiff must
have been in possession of the premises at the time of the trespass.6 4
A "landlord" may, at his option, treat a holdover tenant as a tres-
58. Overdeer v. Lewis, 1 W. & S. 90, 91 (Pa. 1841).
59. Id.
60. 57 Pa. Super. 192 (1914). In this case, an employee occupied one
of the defendant's dwellings as an incident of his employment. Upon
termination of his employment, the prosecutor refused to vacate the dwell-
ing and the defendant entered through a window and ejected the prose-
cutor, his family and his goods. The employer was convicted of forcible
entry even though he used no more force than was necessary and offered
no violence or threats to the prosecutor or his family.
61. Commonwealth v. Everhart, 57 Pa. Super. 192, 200 (1914).
62. Id.
63. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
64. Sennett v. Bucher, 3 Pen. & W. 392, 394 (Pa. 1832).
passer.6 5 Although a landlord is not in actual possession of the
premises when he elects to treat the holding over as a trespass,
the rightful possession which the holdover tenant had is considered
the possession of the landlord"6 and thus an action in trespass is
proper.
A lessee who has never entered into possession of the premises,
however, cannot bring an action in trespass because this action
which complains of a violation of one's possession could not be
proper for one who has neither actual nor constructive possession.
67
Not having entered the premises, a lessee cannot create even a
constructive possession in the face of an actual possession by the
wrongful holdover tenant.6
G. Trespass for Mesne Profits
Trespass for mesne profits is an action for the recovery of the
profits which have been accruing or arising out of the land between
the time when a person's right to possession vested and the time of
his recovery of possession. 9 The right to recover mesne profits for
the use and profits of the land, however, is suspended until posses-
sion is gained by entry or under legal judgment.
70
In Taylor v. Kaufhold,71 the plaintiff-lessee, having gained
possession as a result of an action of ejectment brought by the land-
lord against the holdover tenant, sued in assumpsit and proved
the damages which were the natural and proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful nine month trespass. The plaintiff was al-
lowed to recover the lost profits he would have received if the de-
fendant had delivered possession at the end of his term, and was not
limited to the rental value of the premises. Although the plaintiff
sued in assumpsit, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that
the distinctions between trespass and assumpsit have been abol-
ished, to a large extent, in the interests of justice.7 2  The court
noted that the form of action should not prevent recovery and
considered the proper amendment to have been made.7 3  It can
thus be inferred that the proper action was trespass on the case,
and that the plaintiff's recovery was in trespass. The remedy of
trespass for mesne profits is available to a lessee, but, since it is
suspended until possession of the demised premises is gained, it is
often an ineffective remedy for a reversionary lessee who has not
65. Williams v. Ladew, 171 Pa. 369, 33 A. 344 (1895); Routman v.
Bohm, 194 Pa. Super. 413, 169 A.2d 612 (1961).
66. Strong v. Nesbitt, 267 Pa. 294, 299, 110 A. 250, 251 (1920).
67. Sennett v. Bucher, 3 Pen. & W. 392, 394 (Pa. 1832).
68. Kossell v. Rhoades, 272 Pa. 75, 77, 116 A. 56 (1922).
69. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1376 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). See, e.g.,
Roukous v. DeGraft, 40 R.I. 57, 99 A. 821 (1917).
70. Smith v. Smith, 77 Pa. Super. 227, 234 (1921).
71. 368 Pa. 538, 84 A.2d 347 (1951).




previously entered the premises and has no remedy to obtain pos-
session of the demised premises.
H. Assumpsit
Ordinarily when one occupies the land of another, an obliga-
tion arises to pay for such occupancy. 74 The proper action upon
breach of that obligation would be assumpsit for use and occu-
pancy.7 5 This action is founded on contract, express or implied,
and lies only when the relationship of landlord and tenant exists.7
The relationship of landlord and tenant, however, does not arise
between two consecutive lessees, even when the first lessee holds
over into the term of the second lessee.7 7 The holdover tenant's
status with respect to the subsequent lessee is at most that of
trespasser, and it is quite clear that assumpsit will not lie against
one who occupies land as a mere trespasser.7 8 Furthermore, if the
lessee has no interest in the property, as in the case of a lessee
who has not entered the premises, 79 assumpsit may not be main-
tained.8 0 In resolving this issue in Taylor v. Kaufhold,8 ' the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania inferred that assumpsit was tech-
nically not the proper action for a lessee to bring to recover dam-
ages from a holdover tenant.
8 2
II. RIGHTS AGAINST THE LESSOR
There has been an historical diversity among American juris-
dictions as to a landlord's duty to deliver possession of the demised
premises to his lessee.83 There is considerable precedent support-
ing the two varying positions, known as the American Rule8 4 and
74. In re Cuyler's Estate, 86 Pa. Super. 502, 504 (1925).
75. Id.
76. McCloskey v. Miller, 72 Pa. 151, 154 (1873).
77. Am. JuR. 2d Landlord & Tenant § 100 (1970).
78. McCloskey v. Miller, 72 Pa. 151, 154 (1873).
79. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
80. Philadelphia v. Pa. Sugar Co., 348 Pa. 599, 603, 36 A.2d 653, 655
(1944).
81. 368 Pa. 538, 84 A.2d 347 (1951).
82. See notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra.
83. See Annot. 70A.L.R. 151 (1931).
84. California: Lost Key Mines v. Hamilton, 109 Cal. App. 2d 569,
241 P.2d 273 (1952); Playter v. Cunningham, 21 Cal. 229 (1862); Hawaii:
Judd v. Ladd, 1 Haw. 75 (1845); Illinois: Gazzolo v. Chambers, 73 Ill. 75
(1874); Maryland: Rice v. Biltmore Apts. Co., 141 Md. 507, 119 A. 364
(1922); Massachusetts: Snider v. Deban, 249 Mass. 59 (1923); Mississippi:
West v. Kitchell, 109 Miss. 328 (1915); New Hampshire: Prendergast v.
Young, 21 N.H. 234 (1850); New York: Gardner v. Keteltas, 3 Hill 330
(1842); Vermont: Underwood v. Birchard, 47 Vt. 305 (1875); Virginia:
Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930). The American Rule is
sometimes referred to as the New York Rule.
the English Rule.85 However, the present weight of authority
seems to favor the English Rule. The essence of the English Rule,
as first stated in Coe v. Clay,80 is that the lessor impliedly cove-
nants that the premises shall be open to entry by the tenant on the
first day of the term; this covenant is breached if possession is with-
held from the lessee either wrongfully or by right."'
The American Rule merely views the implied covenant to de-
liver possession as a corollary to the covenant of quiet enjoyment,
holding that possession must not be withheld from the lessee by
the lessor himself, one holding under the lessor by right, or one
holding under paramount title. The leading case espousing this
rule is Gardner v. Keteltas,8 8 wherein the Court of Appeals of New
York required the lessor to deliver only the legal right to posses-
sion to his lessee.
It is important to note at this point that neither rule is ger-
mane if the parties have expressly stated their covenants in their
lease. Both rules are in accord that the covenant to deliver pos-
session is breached when the lessee is excluded by acts of the lessor,
or when the lessor cannot deliver a valid legal right to possession.
When, however, a lessee is excluded from possession by a third
party who wrongfully occupies the premises, the allocation of risk
between the lessor and the lessee depends upon the legal presump-
tion attached to the intentions of the parties. The English Rule
and the American Rule represent the two presumptions which
govern in this circumstance.
The rationale for the English Rule is summarized by the often
quoted phrase "he who lets, agrees to give possession and not
merely a chance of a law suit."8 9 In King v. Reynolds,90 a leading
English Rule case, the Alabama Supreme Court stated that "the
prime motive for the contract [to lease] is, that the lessee shall
have possession; as much so as if a chattel were the subject of the
85. Alabama: King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229 (1880); Arkansas: Rose
v. Wynn, 42 Ark. 257 (1883); Arizona: Cheshire v. Thurston, 70 Ariz.
299, 219 P.2d 1043 (1950); Connecticut: Cohn v. Norton, 57 Conn. 480
(1889); Indiana; Spencer v. Burton, 5 Blackf. 57 (1838); Kansas: Stewart
v. Murphy, 95 Kan. 421, 148 P. 609 (1915); Kentucky: Mattingly v. Brents,
155 Ky. 570 (1913); Missouri: Rieger v. Welles, 110 Mo. App. 166 (1904);
New Jersey: Adrian v. Rabinowitz, 116 N.J.L. 586, 186 A. 29 (1936);
Nebraska: Herpolsheimer v. Christopher, 76 Neb. 352, 107 N.W. 382 (1906);
New Mexico: Barfield v. Damon, 56 N.M. 515, 245 P.2d 1032 (1952);
North Carolina: Sloan v. Hart, 150 N.C. 269, 63 S.E. 1037 (1909); Ohio:
Mullins v. Brown, 87 Oh. App. 427, 94 N.E.2d 574; Oklahoma: King v.
Coombs, 36 Okla. 396, 122 P. 181 (1911); Oregon: Obermeier v. Mattson,
98 Oreg. 195, 192 P. 283 (1920); Tennessee: Bloch v. Busch, 160 Tenn. 21,
22 S.W.2d 242 (1929); Texas: Hertzberg v. Beisenbach, 64 Tex. 262 (1885);
Washington: Shreiner v. Stanton, 26 Wash. 563 (1902); Wisconsin: Cross
v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314 (1904).
86. 5 Bing. 440, 130 Eng. Rep. 1131 (C.P. 1829).
87. King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229, 232 (1880).
88. 3 Hill 330 (N.Y. 1842).
89. Coe v. Clay, 5 Bing. 440, 130 Eng. Rep. 1131 (C.P. 1829).
90. 67 Ala. 229 (1880).
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purchase." 91 In that case, the court drew an analogy between a
lease and a contract to sell a chattel, the latter normally requiring
a delivery of possession as a prerequisite to its consummation.
This argument appears faulty in several respects. The chattel ra-
tionale is rebutted in Hannan v. Dusch,92 where the Supreme Court
of Virginia pointed out that a lease "is not a mere chattel which
passes by delivery, but a chattel real. '93 The chattel interest in a
lease is not the premises, but the lessee's title and his right to pos-
session, which become perfect at the commencement of the term.
94
Leading commentators in the area of real property have differed
as to the applicability of contract law to leases. Tiffany feels that
it is erroneous and misleading to speak of leases in contract terms,
95
while Thompson states that property concepts control the contract
aspects of leases.96 Even if the chattel rationale were accepted, an
additional flaw in this analogy is that physical delivery of a chattel
is not an absolute requirement in all contracts.
97
The rationale underlying the American Rule is that "[the law]
will not judge that the lessor covenanted against the wrongful
acts of strangers unless the covenant be full and express to the
purpose."98 In Hannan v. Dusch,99 the Supreme Court of Virginia
critically observed that the English Rule is a unique exception
"which stands alone in implying a contract of insurance on the part
of the lessor to save his tenant from the flagrant wrong of another
person."'100 The court went on to say that "such an obligation is so
unusual and the prevention of such a tort so impossible as to make
it certain, we think, that it should always rest upon an express con-
tract."' 0 ' The jurisdictions adopting the American Rule have been
unwilling to extend the covenant of quiet enjoyment beyond the
acts of the lessor or someone holding a paramount title; nor have
they been willing to view the covenant to deliver possession as a
separate covenant as suggested by Thompson.102
91. Id. at 233 (parenthetical material added).
92. 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1924).
93. Id. at 360, 153 S.E. at 827.
94. In Pennsylvania and some other jurisdictions, entry by the lessee
is necessary to perfect his title. However, even in these jurisdictions, the
right to possession as against the lessor is perfected at the commencement
of the term.
95. 1 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, §§ 74, 95 (3d ed. 1939).
96. 3 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY, §§ 1110, 1112 (1959).
97. 2 S. WILLISTON ON SALES, §§ 263, 405(a), 454 (Rev. ed. 1948).
98. Gardner v. Keteltas, 3 Hill 330, 332 (N.Y. 1842).
99. 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930).
100. Id. at 363, 153 S.E. at 830.
101. Id.
102. 3 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY, § 1130 (1959).
The American and English rules have apparently evolved out
of different circumstances and thus the two rules may not be as
divergent as they appear. The rights of the lessor and lessee in a
given jurisdiction may well be the key to the adoption of one rule
over the other. One commentator has suggested that "logic would
seem to require that the basis for a court's choice between the two
available rules-the English and the American-would be inextri-
cably connected with the proper party maintaining a summary
remedy of possession.' 1 3 Thus, where the lessor is the only party
capable of maintaining the action, there should be a duty upon the
landlord to deliver actual possession, but no such duty should exist
where the lessee is also permitted to maintain the summary pro-
ceeding.' 0 ' This thesis seems to have been supported by the case
law of the jurisdictions which have ruled on this issue.10 5 Ala-
bama has adopted the English Rule'016 and in distinguishing Gard-
ner v. Keteltas0 7 and Gazzolo v. Chambers,"6s cases decided in
jurisdictions which adhere to the American Rule, the Supreme
Court of Alabama stated:
[I]t would seem that they [New York and Illinois] have
statutes authorizing a lessee to dispossess a trespasser found
in possession, or tenant holding over, by summary remedy.
In this state, no statute exists by which a tenant, not having
had prior possession, can evict such intruder by summary
proceeding. The lessor in such case could.10 9
It appears initially that Pennsylvania has adopted the Ameri-
can Rule. In fact, Cozens v. Stevenson'10 has been cited as the first
case to adopt this rule.111 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held in Cozens, that there was no implied warranty to deliver pos-
session where a lease to commence in futuro stated that there was
a third party then in possession.112 However, the court restricted
its decision to the specific facts presented, holding that no implied
duty to deliver possession arose from the terms of that lease.'" The
court reasoned that by expressly incorporating in the lease the fact
that a third party was then in possession, both parties must have
contemplated that the tenant might hold over. In spite of this
possibility, there was no mention in the lease of a special duty on
103. Comment, The Landlord's Duty to Place a Tenant into Possession-
Forcible-Entry and Unlawful-Detainer Statutes, 35 TENN. L. REV. 656, 657
(1968).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 672, n.149.
106. King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229 (1880).
107. 3 Hill 330 (N.Y. 1842).
108. 73 Ill. 75 (1874).
109. King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229, 232 (1880).
110. 5 S. & R. 421 (Pa. 1819).
111. Comment, The Landlord's Duty to Place a Tenant into Possession-
Forcible-Entry and Unlawful-Detainer Statutes, 35 TENN. L. REv. 656, 657
n.8 (1968).




the landlord to guarantee possession at the beginning of the term.
The tenant in this case obtained a power of attorney from the land-
lord in his lease, by virtue of which he proceeded against the hold-
over tenant, and recovered possession of the premises." 4 The court
followed the apparent contractual intent of the parties and placed
no duty to deliver possession upon the landlord. No real hardship
was placed on the lessee since he had the power to gain possession
of the premises by a summary proceeding as a result of the power of
attorney.
Rice v. McGarvey"' involved facts very similar to those in
Cozens, although it was not expressly stated in the lease that a ten-
ant was then in possession. Prior to the commencement of the new
lessee's term, the lessor notified him that the tenant in possession
refused to vacate and offered to return the $200 prepaid rent.
This was rejected by the lessee, and in a subsequent suit for dam-
ages against the lessor for failure to deliver possession, a verdict
was directed for the lessee for the $200 paid in advance plus in-
terest. On plaintiff's motion for a new trial, the Court of Common
Pleas of Allegheny County refused to grant a new trial, relying on
the Cozens rule that no duty to deliver possession rested on the
lessor in the absence of an express covenant. The lessor-defendant
did not appeal; thus the question of whether the lessee was entitled
to any recovery was not reviewed. Strict reliance on the rule laid
down in Cozens, the American Rule, would have found no duty
upon the lessor, therefore, no breach and no recovery by the lessee.
The lessee in Rice had no remedy for the recovery of possession
of the demised premises and rather than impose such a hardship,
the court allowed the lessee to rescind the contract and obtain re-
stitution of the prepaid rent, returning the parties to their pre-
contract positions. 116 This decision by the Common Pleas Court
of Allegheny County would seem therefore, to represent a middle
ground between the English and American Rules by placing the
risk that the lessee will be excluded by a wrongful third party
equally upon the lessor and lessee.
The most recent statement of Pennsylvania law concerning the
duty of a lessor to deliver possession to his lessee was in Dougherty
v. Thomas.1 7 Although the case was not decided on this issue,118
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in dictum, recognized the exist-
114. Id. at 422.
115. 70 Pitts. L.J. 1055 (Pa. C.P. 1922).
116. Accord, Allegaert v. Smart, 10 W.N.C. 29 (C.P. Phila. 1881).
117. 313 Pa. 287, 169 A. 219 (1933).
118. Id. The court held that the coal lease constituted a sale of the
ence of an implied covenant to deliver possession in stating that
"the implied covenant of a lessor as to delivery of possession is
merely that there shall be at the time the lessee's right to posses-
sion attaches, no impediment to his taking possession."'1 19 In this
case the lessee was attempting to invoke a breach of the implied
covenant to deliver possession as a defense to an action for rent.
The only impediment alleged by the lessee was a trespass which
he had directed in the capacity of general manager of the company
holding a clay lease on the premises. The court responded to this
allegation in stating " [i] t would be a legal anomaly if a lessee could
successfully invoke as a defense to the payment of an agreed-to
rent for a property, a trespass which he himself directed.' 120
The phrasing of the implied covenant to deliver possession in
Dougherty is almost identical to that in King v. Reynolds,1"1 the
leading American case adopting the English Rule. Although the
implied covenant to deliver possession was not the determinative
issue in Dougherty, the court, via dictum seems to have espoused
the English Rule, modified by the logical corollary that the cove-
nant does not extend to acts under the control of the lessee. The
contention that a covenant to deliver possession will be implied
in Pennsylvania is supported by those cases which, in denying a
lessee the right to ejectment prior to entry, state that his remedy
is against the lessor.
122
III. CONCLUSION
It is unclear whether Pennsylvania law implies a covenant to
deliver actual possession to the lessee in the absence of an express
covenant. The case law has made no clear statement whether the
American or the English Rule is the law in Pennsylvania. There
has been little case law in this area of the law in Pennsylvania, with
the most recent decision in 1933.123 The present housing shortage
in this state and the power of a landlord to bring a summary pro-
ceeding against a holdover tenant where a lessee cannot, must be
considered in determining which rule to adopt. The logic behind
a rule requiring a landlord to deliver actual possession where the
lessee personally cannot maintain a summary proceeding against a
holdover tenant 124 is even more compelling when it is remembered
that, in Pennsylvania, a lessee who has not entered the premises
coal and thus no proof of entry into possession by the lessee was essential.
119. Id. at 295, 169 A. at 222.
120. Id.
121. 67 Ala. 229, 233 (1880). "In other words, that there shall then be
no impediment to his taking possession." [sic] Compare with text accom-
panying note 120 supra.
122. Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 225 Pa. 338, 74 A. 207 (1909);
Sennett v. Bucher, 3 Pen. & W. 392 (1832); Dime Bank & Trust Co. v.
Walsh, 143 Pa. Super. 189, 17 A.2d 728 (1941).
123. Dougherty v. Thomas, 313 Pa. 287, 169 A. 219 (1933).
124. See notes 103-105 and accompanying text supra.
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may not even maintain ejectment. 125 One solution would be to
follow the lead of the New York legislature which, by statute,
made delivery of actual possession an implied condition of all leases
of real property. 126 Such a position is an equitable solution in that
neither lessee nor lessor will be responsibile for the wrongful acts
of third parties and the lessee is not required to bring a law suit
in order to prevent a loss.
It is apparent that a lessee who has not entered the demised
premises does not have a remedy to gain possession of the prem-
ises under Pennsylvania law.127 The primary object of most leases
for use and occupancy is to obtain living quarters. A power to
rescind the contract of lease does not fulfill this objective. It is
suggested that a lessee be given a statutory remedy for the recovery
of possession of real property. The requirement of entry and the
interesse termini should be abolished. This was done in England
by the Law of Property Act 1925.128 The effect of this Act was to
make all leases for a term of years effective from the date fixed
for the commencement of the term, even without entry.
Upon the enactment of such a statute in Pennsylvania, a lessee
would be able to recover possession of the demised premises by
ejectment, even though he had not previously entered the premises.
However, a lessee, desirous of obtaining living quarters, may not be
able to bear the hardships which the delays and expenses of an
ejectment might entail. Therefore, to remedy such a likely, but
unfortunate, situation, it is suggested that the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure for Justices of the Peace be modified to extend the remedy
of a summary proceeding for the recovery of possession of real
property to include lessees entitled to possession.
THOMAS B. KENWORTHY
125. See notes 11-21 and accompanying text supra.
126. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 223-a (McKinney 1968):
In the absence of an express provision to the contrary, there
shall be implied in every lease of real property a condition that
the lessor will deliver possession at the beginning of the term.
In the event of breach of such implied condition the lessee shall
have the right to rescind the lease and recover the consideration
paid. Such right shall not be deemed inconsistent with any right
of action he may have to recover damages.
(Added L. 1962, c. 170, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1962).
127. See notes 11-63 and accompanying text supra.
128. 15 & 16 Geo. 5 c. 20.
